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For power-plant investments, utilities rely after liberalisation on private financial markets, which are in general 
distorted. The (related) split of social and private time-preference rates provides a new reason for a welfare-enhancing 
policy intervention, complementary to environmental policy (Heinzel and Winkler 2007). This paper quantifies it and 
studies its relevance for the German power industry around 2015. The distortions remain moderate as compared to 
other investment subsidies. However, in contrast to environmental policy alone, its additional implementation makes 
nuclear power the first option even in the nuclear high-cost scenario. Both policies enhance ecological structural 
change, which end-of-pipe abatement delays. 
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In liberalised energy markets, private utilities rely on private nancial markets to nance
power-plant investments. However, as is well recognised in economics and nance, nan-
cial markets in real world are systematically distorted. The distortion derives in general
from dierent sources. They include, e.g., distortionary taxation, distortionary public
investment, imperfect competition, production externalities, adverse-selection problems,
or uninsurable long-run risks (e.g. Gollier 2002, Grant and Quiggin 2003, Hubbard 1998,
Lind 1982, Mehra and Prescott 2003). The (related) split of social and private time-
preference rates induces, in addition to that from the emission externality, a further dis-
tortion in the investment conditions for new technologies (Heinzel and Winkler 2007).
It provides a new reason to complement environmental policy by another policy, such
as technology policy, in the transition to a low-emission energy industry. The purpose
of this paper is to quantify and to study the relevance of the welfare implications of
diverging social and private discount rates for the German electricity industry around
2015. In Germany, by 2020 40 GWe or about one third of the net installed capacity is
to be replaced as a part of usual reinvestment cycles. To this by about 2022 another 20
GWe add due to the political decision to phase out nuclear energy.
The analysis focuses on the threefold investment-related trade-o of a single cost-
minimising utility under environmental policy. Disposing over an established polluting
power plant with nite lifetime, it has, eventually, not only to decide (i) which new
technology to introduce and (ii) when, but also (iii) whether rst, or never, to gradually
rene its existing plant, e.g., by enactment of an end-of-pipe abatement technology. The
analysis proceeds in two steps. First, its choice among three new generation technolo-
gies (hard coal, gas, nuclear) is investigated, then its choice of the optimal moment of
transition from the established polluting to a new less polluting plant. For the second
step the investment conditions are projected on a temporal scale. Seven scenarios are
considered. Apart from the no-policy benchmark the cases of environmental policy and
varying levels of the social imputed interest rate (rs) as distinct from the private (rp)
are analysed, rst separately, then combined, for the cases of both the absence and the
presence of an end-of-pipe abatement option. The focus is on conventional technologies
for baseload electricity generation, as they will still play the major role in upcoming
reinvestment cycles and are likely to be the most aected by the interest-rate distortion.
The unit costs of electricity (UCel) are calculated using the levelised-cost-of-electricity
(LCOE) methodology. Technical and economic parameters and sensitivity ranges of the
policy parameters are derived from scientic and public studies as cited below.
The paper exceeds previous studies, such as BEI (2004), Enquetekommission (2002),
EWI and Prognos (2005), and IEA and NEA (2005), in ve ways. First, while the impor-
tance of the discount rate is well recognised and results are often considered for dierent
levels, the impact of correcting optimal policy interventions as induced by deviations
from its socially optimal level has not yet been analysed. Second, the study of their ef-
fect against the background of varying CO2-price levels also provides a detailed analysis
of the impact of environmental policy on the ranking of the considered technologies.
Third, the projection of the investment conditions on a temporal scale allows to explic-
2itly account for eects on the timing of structural change in the energy industry. Fourth,
by taking into account nuclear power, notably in two dierent cost scenarios, some
clarication is added to the relative prospects of this technology in the future German
generation mix. Finally, treating emission and abatement costs as separate categories in
the nancial model, necessary levels of abatement unit costs (AUC) and CO2 prices are
determined for a new end-of-pipe abatement option, such as carbon-capture-and-storage
(CCS) technologies, to be relevant.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces analytical setting and nan-
cial model. Section 3 species and discusses the technological and economic parameters.
Section 4 analyses the utility's technology choice, section 5 the optimal moments of tran-
sition to the new technologies under the seven mentioned scenarios. Section 6 summarises
and discusses the results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Analytical setting and nancial model
Consider a single cost-minimising utility which runs a coal-red power plant (T1) com-
missioned in 1990, and disposes at its hand over three types of new specic technologies
(T2), a new coal-red, a gas-red, and a nuclear power plant available for commercial
operation by 2015.1 In contrast to the fossil technologies, nuclear power is clean in terms
of CO2 emissions.2 For emission abatement, a CCS technology may be enacted. In accord
with the ideal of, in particular, liberalised energy markets perfect competition is assumed
for all markets such that the utility acts as a price taker. Electricity is homogeneous.
The construction of a new power plant constitutes a small private investment project
and does, thus uncorrelated with GDP, not aect the social rate of return, is.
The analysis focuses on the in
uence of two market failures on the utility's optimal
decisions, the one stemming from the (negatively valued) CO2 emissions, the other one
associated with the split of social and private rates of time preference. Given a polluting
production system, the two externalities become apparent considering a representative






with i = p;s.3 Both are assumed to derive instantaneous utility from energy consump-
tion, c, and disutility from net emissions, e, i.e. @U
@c > 0, @U
@e < 0. The emission externality
induces environmental policy. As it does not matter whether the optimal CO2-price level
1 Lignite, though the most important domestic energy carrier, is not considered as there is no actual
market for it. Due to its persistently low price it is expected to keep its share in the German generation
mix in the period under consideration despite a cost-intensive rise in net thermal eciency from 43
to 48% and its higher emission factor of 0.396 t CO2/MWh (BEI 2004, EWI and Prognos 2005).
2 Life cycle assessments show for nuclear power similarly low greenhouse-gas emissions as for renewable
energies. For coal they are about 30, for gas about 13 times higher (Owen 2004, Fritsche et al. 2007).
3 See Heinzel and Winkler (2007) for an encompassing welfare analysis in a general equilibrium model.
3is implemented via an emission tax or an emission permit trading scheme, in the fol-
lowing only directly positive CO2-price levels (e > 0) are considered. As an outcome
of the economic discounting debate, the representative consumer is moreover generally
recognised to apply in general a higher rate of time preference than socially optimal, i.e.
p > s (Heinzel and Winkler 2007). The split time-preference rates do not constitute
a market failure in themselves. Their split rather occurs as an eect of some underly-
ing distortion. It provides a general case for a welfare-enhancing policy intervention. In
general it results from several dierent causes such that for the correction of the implied
distortions a policy mix is necessary. Thus far, there has been no systematic research
with respect to the causes of, as well as their quantitative contribution to the split.
Therefore, in this paper the bundle of policy measures necessary to correct the split
and resulting distortions is summarised by the term technology policy. For the investing
utility the diverging time-preference rates materialise in a distorted nancial market.
Thus, the (private) imputed interest rate, based on its market observations, exceeds the
socially optimal, i.e. rp > rs.
The unit costs of electricity are determined based on the LCOE methodology. The
particular nancial model, adapted from Bejan et al. (1996: ch. 7), is introduced in
appendix A.1. This methodology has been criticised for not suciently accounting for the
increased uncertainty of power-plant investments after liberalisation (e.g. IEA and NEA
2005, MIT 2003). Instead, especially real-option approaches have been used (Epaulard
and Gallon 2001, Gollier et al. 2005, Roques et al. 2006, Rothwell 2006). However, for
the sake of comparability with previous studies and as there is thus far no alternative
analytical scheme established, this paper stays with the conventional approach.
3 Data and parameter specication
The data at the basis of the analysis in sections 4 and 5 refer as far as possible to the
situation in Germany around 2015. The parameters are summarised in appendix A.3.
3.1 Technical parameters
The technical and economic estimates for the reference power plants refer in the case of
coal to plants operating on the basis of combustion of pulverised coal in conventional
boilers, in the case of gas to a combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT). For nuclear power
they refer to the European Pressurised Water Reactor (EPR), a large boiling- (i.e. light-)
water reactor of generation III+ of nuclear power stations, designed to meet German
and French safety standards. It is currently the most seriously discussed build for new
deployment in Europe. Oriented towards the prospected size of the EPR, a net installed
capacity to be replaced of 1,500 MWe is considered. The plants are supposed to operate
with a capacity factor 85%. Generally accurate for coal, this gure is relatively high
for gas and rather low for nuclear. As regards the technical parameters of the coal-red
reference power plants, net thermal eciencies of 45 and 51%, respectively, a construction
period of 4 and an economic lifetime of 40 years are assumed, for the gas-red power
plant 60%, 2 and 25 years, for the nuclear power plant 38%, 5 and 40 years, respectively.
43.2 Cost parameters
Fossil technologies. Oriented towards BEI (2004) and IEA and NEA (2005: 120), for the
old and the new coal-red power plant, respectively, specic investment costs of 925 and
1,025, specic decommissioning costs of 34.5, xed specic annual O&M costs of 40 and
36.6 T-¤/MWe and variable specic O&M costs of 4.0 and 2.7 ¤/MWh are assumed.
The respective gures for gas are 525, 15.8, 18.8 T-¤/MWe and 1.6 ¤/MWh. Fuel prices
are expected to develop dierently among the energy carriers. For hard coal, in the con-
sidered period, i.e. 2015{55, reinforced by increasing oil prices for transport, moderately
rising real prices are expected (EWI and Prognos 2005, 2006, IEA and NEA 2005). Real
gas prices are supposed to increase more signicantly due to worsening reservoirs and
high transport costs, despite decreasing real costs for transport via pipeline or liqueed
natural gas. For clarity of results, though clearly restrictive, the analysis focuses on one
medium expected fuel-price level for each energy carrier considered. The consideration
of dierent price scenarios would have neatly complicated the results without changing
them in substance. The coal and gas price assumptions refer to the indications given in
EWI and Prognos (2005: 296) for Germany and the escalation expressed in the older
estimations cited in IEA and NEA (2005: 121). The projected prices are the prices at
the power plant, i.e. including transport and processing (Table 1). They do not include









Table 1: Real prices for hard coal and natural gas at the plant (¤/MWh) (EWI and
Prognos 2005: 296, IEA and NEA 2005: 121, own calculations).
stant mean coal price of 6.70 ¤/MWh is assumed, for the new one 7.05 ¤/MWh, for the
CCGT reference power plant a constant mean gas price of 16.8 ¤/MWh. For later com-
missioning dates, the mean gas price is derived, equivalently, as the 40-years arithmetical
mean based on the above indications.
Nuclear power. The expected costs and prospects of nuclear power after liberalisation
are the object of an ongoing debate (e.g. Enquetekommission 2002, Epaulard and Gallon
2001, Gollier et al. 2005, IEA and NEA 2005, MIT 2003, NEA 2003, Roques et al. 2006,
Rothwell 2006, The University of Chicago 2004). As important factors the lack of recent
construction experience, regulatory and political obstacles related to obtaining construc-
tion and operating licenses for new plants, and the long payback period associated with
high capital costs and large plant size are mentioned. In addition to the direct costs,
5dierent aspects are often suggested to entail external costs. They include radioactivity
releases in routine operation, radioactive waste disposal, future nancial liabilities from
decommissioning and dismantling, and severe accidents. Under current regulation, capi-
tal and operating costs and fuel-cycle facilities internalise most of the potential external
costs. In particular, high level waste disposal costs, until nal repositories are in opera-
tion, are treated as future nancial liabilities and included in the fuel costs. With regard
to eects of severe accidents the third-party liability system has been implemented as
a special legal regime to provide insurance coverage for any potential damages. For the
case of Germany, it is to be noted that the question of nuclear waste treatment and nal
disposal is, however, not yet fully decided on political level. Uncertainties are, moreover,
still associated with the valuation of severe accidents. They are discussed in economics as
a part of the more general debate on the valuation of low-probability high-consequence
negative events (e.g. Eeckhoudt et al. 2000, Itaoko et al. 2006, Kunreuther et al. 2001,
Schneider and Zweifel 2004). While these studies have considerably been rening the
respective tools and considerations, still more research needs to be done, notably for
Germany, in order to provide for a well-pondered basis for political decisions.
In view of the wide range of gures in the literature, two nuclear cost scenarios are con-
sidered. The low-cost scenario (Nl) assumes specic investment costs of 1,800 T-¤/MWe,
as a moderate lower bound oriented towards Enquetekommission (2002) and IEA and
NEA (2005), the high-cost scenario (Nh) 2,600 T-¤/MWe, as a moderate upper bound
according to the more pessimistic Enquetekommission (2002) gures.4 For both cases,
the specic decommissioning costs are assumed to amount to 155 T-¤/MWe, the xed
specic annual O&M costs to 30 T-¤/MWe and the variable specic O&M costs to
3.6 ¤/MWh (IEA and NEA 2005: 120). Nuclear fuel costs, comprising front- and back-
end costs, are expected to continue to stay constant in the next decades (The University
of Chicago 2004). Following the indications in IEA and NEA (2005: 44) for Germany,
the total nuclear fuel cycle unit costs are assumed to amount to 4.0 ¤/MWh.
Abatement costs. The pollution intensity of a technology depends on the emission
factor of its fuel input and a plant's gross thermal eciency. The emission factor is
dened as the mean mass of pollutant per energy unit (caloric value) of the fuel input.
For the subsequent analysis, CO2 emission factors for coal and gas of 0.338 and 0.2
t CO2/MWh input, respectively, are assumed (BEI 2004: A{9). In the given analytical
setting the utility disposes over two abatement options. First, it can introduce a new less
polluting technology. Second, it can enact an end-of-pipe abatement technology rening
its existing and, if polluting, its new electric generation technology. Only in the second
case particular abatement costs arise. The debate on end-of-pipe abatement has recently
been revived by the development of CCS technologies as a major approach for the (quasi)
complete abatement of carbon emissions of (large) power stations (EWI and Prognos
2005: 121{125, WI et al. 2007). In conventional processes, CO2 is captured from the

ue gases produced during combustion. Best known is chemical absorption via aqueous
alkaline solvents such as monoethanolamine (MEA). It is expected to be among the rst
such technologies available by 2015. Thus far, only relatively broad cost estimates for
4 Neither BEI (2004) nor EWI and Prognos (2005) particularly treat nuclear power.
6CO2 capture, transport and storage have been indicated. Following EWI and Prognos
(2005: 125), specic CCS full cost ranges of 37{70 and 32{65 ¤/t CO2 for coal and gas,
respectively, are assumed. In the analysis below, AUC of 10{60 ¤/t are considered.
3.3 Policy parameters
Environmental policy. For the utility, environmental policy becomes relevant in form of
a positive emission price, e. e(t) indicates the constant mean real price per ton CO2 for
the period t under consideration. It directly imposes the emission costs to the polluting
utility. The sensitivity range for e in the analysis below is oriented towards the CO2
prices which have been occurring under the EU emission trading scheme to which the
EU Member States, including Germany, are subject since 2005. In its rst phase 2005{
2007 CO2 prices have been ranging between 6 and 30 ¤/t, with a core range of about
15{25 ¤/t (e.g. Borak et al. 2006, ECX 2007, Sijm et al. 2005, 2006, Uhrig-Homburg and
Wagner 2007).5 In the second period the supply of EU allowances (EUA) will be reduced
as compared to the rst and later on generally continue to decrease, such that for an
at best similarly decreasing demand, non-decreasing prices might be expected. However,
notably in view of ongoing discussions concerning, e.g., the initial allowance allocation,
the banking option, and polluter participation more generally, concrete projections for
2015 and later remain dicult. The penalty levels for illegal emissions, ned with 40 ¤/t
in the rst trading period and 100 ¤/t from the second period onwards, set a neat upper
bound for the expected price development. For the environmental-policy parameter, e,
in this study a sensitivity range of 0{60 ¤/t is considered. The range of 5{30 ¤/t is
taken as its relevant range in the period under consideration, i.e. the range in which CO2
prices are expected to stay most likely.
Technology policy. A power-plant construction project should yield at least the return
of an alternative investment on nancial markets. This is generally equivalent to having
a positive net present value. Decisive for its calculation is the real imputed interest rate.
It derives as the mean of the (real) rates of return on equity and debt weighted with the
fractions of equity and debt nancing, respectively. To account for the distorted nancial
markets, the analysis below considers a private (benchmark) level of the real imputed
interest rate (rp) as deriving from the utility's market observations as against a range of
socially optimal ones (rs). For convenience and corresponding to the common practice
in the literature, no distinction is made regarding the specic nancing conditions of
particular technologies. The welfare implications of the time-preference distortion are
quantied at the deviation of the UCel at the busbar from their socially optimal level.
In the cited studies the discounting issue has been treated in varying degrees of inten-
sity. IEA and NEA (2005: 183) considers a 5% discount rate as approximately consistent
with investments in the former regulated environment, and 10% as a proxy for power-
plant investments in deregulated markets in the U.S. MIT (2003) and The University of
Chicago (2004) calculate for upcoming US nuclear power investments with rp = 0:125.
5 At present, studies on the issue have not left the working-paper status. In this paper no distinction
is made between spot and forward prices. Preliminary results indicate that the latter exceed the rst
and that forward markets lead the price discovery process.
7For Germany, IEA and NEA (2005: 122f) adopts the general 5 and 10% rates, while
BEI (2004: 8-2) uses an 8% imputed interest rate. Schneider (1998: 51) considers sce-
narios with real rates of `low' 5.7, `probable' 8.9, and `high' 12.2%. EWI and Prognos
(2005: 295) uses a 10% rate, referring to Enzensberger (2003) who found rp 2 [0:08;0:12]
for respective investments in Germany.6 Social discount rates, on the other hand, have
thus far been determined in dierent ways. Germany has been applying a 3% rate for
the evaluation of public projects based on the federal government's average real re-
nancing rate over the past ve years, France an 8% real rate derived with respect to
the marginal product of capital. In the UK, until 2003 a 6% rate was applied based on
considerations of both capital costs and social time preferences. After re-basing it then
entirely on social time preferences, it dropped to 3.5%. Evans and Sezer (2004, 2005)
apply the latter approach to major EU and OECD countries, nding, e.g., for France a
real rate of 3.2, for Germany 4.3, for Japan 5.0, for the UK 4.0, and for the U.S. 4.6%.
Denmark and Ireland display the extrema with 2.4 and 6.8%, respectively. The variation
between the rates is mainly due to dierences in the national per capita growth rates
in the considered years, 1970{2001. Given the current state of research, the above rates
for power-plant nancing and the social discount rates are derived with respect to both
dierent models and data. Inhowfar the latter rates are actually consistent with those
occuring on undistorted nancial markets is an important matter for further investiga-
tion. Probably, the present gures rather describe a lower bound for the socially optimal
discounting of private investments. This paper assumes rp = 0:1. For the social level a
sensitivity range of rs 2 [0:02;0:08] is considered.
4 Technology choice under environmental and technology policies
This section studies based on the above assumptions the single and combined in
uences
of environmental and technology policies on the utility's choice of a new electric genera-
tion technology, rst in the absence, then the presence of a CO2 abatement technology.
4.1 Technology choice without abatement technology
In the no-policy benchmark, the new hard-coal power plant displays the lowest unit costs
of electricity (UCT2), before gas, nuclear in the Nl and Nh scenarios (Table 2).
UCT2
rp C G Nl Nh
0.1 37.12 40.33 46.05 58.16
Table 2: Unit costs of electricity at busbar of new plant alternatives in no-policy bench-
mark (¤/MWh) (own calculations).
To understand the following results it is useful to know the UCT2 contributions of the
single cost components distinguished in appendix A.1 (Table 3). Striking are the high
6 Enquetekommission (2002) does not contain a treatment of the discounting issue.
8CC and low FC shares in the cases of nuclear, and the high FC and low CC shares in
the case of gas. The DC share amounts in any case to less than 1%.
Shares in UCT2
C G Nl Nh
CC 41.6 18.8 59.2 67.7
OMC 20.5 10.2 16.5 13.1
FC 37.7 70.9 23.5 18.6
DC 0.2 0.1 0.8 0.6
Table 3: Shares of capital investment, O&M, fuel, and decommissioning costs in unit
costs of electricity of new plant alternatives in no-policy benchmark, discounted to year
of commissioning (percent) (own calculations).
4.1.1 Sensitivity under environmental policy
The UCT2 behavior of the reference power plants if an emission price e as described in
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Figure 1: Unit costs of electricity of new plant alternatives for varying CO2-price levels
(¤/t) under rp = 0:1 (¤/MWh) (own calculations).
as long as e  9:75 ¤/t. For e 2 (9:75;17:0(53:5)] ¤/t gas dominates in the Nl (Nh)
scenario. For e > 17:0 (53.5) ¤/t nuclear is the rst option. The varied UCT2 impact
of environmental policy re
ects the dierent emission factors and eciencies among the
technologies. Accordingly, gas becomes, despite its high FC share, dominant over coal
9for lower e within the relevant range. For nuclear power there is a certain e at which
its ecological advantage also turns into an economic.
4.1.2 Sensitivity under technology policy
Figure 2 shows the UCT2 behavior of the new plant alternatives if the socially optimal
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Figure 2: Unit costs of electricity of new plant alternatives for varying levels of social
imputed interest rate (¤/MWh) (own calculations).
the reversal between gas and nuclear in the Nl scenario as second cheapest technology
for rs < 0:054, the technology ranking remains unaltered over the considered rs range as
compared to the no-policy benchmark. The varied UCT2 impact of the rs implementation
among the technologies depends on their dierent CC shares, clearly dominating a slight
counteracting DC impact. It is, accordingly, the strongest in the case of nuclear in
the Nh scenario, before nuclear in the Nl scenario, coal and gas. The UCT2 distortion
can be calculated as the dierence between their levels evaluated at rp and rs. For
rs 2 [0:02;0:08], for coal, gas, and nuclear in the Nl (Nh) scenario the respective
distortions range between 2.12{7.24, 1.04{3.55, and 3.68{12.48 (5.36{18.25) ¤/MWh,
or 5.7{19.5, 2.6{8.8, and 8.0{27.1 (9.2{31.4)% of the distorted UCT2, respectively.
4.1.3 Sensitivity under environmental and technology policies combined
The combined in
uence of environmental and technology policies in the Nl and the Nh
scenario, respectively, over the e range considered for rp = 0:1 and exemplary rs of
0.08 and 0.02 can be seen from the strong UCT2 lines and their parallels in Figures 3
10and 4 below. In the Nl scenario, for rs 2 [0:02;0:08] coal remains the rst option until
e 2 [5:5;11:0] ¤/t. Above e 2 [5:5;11:0] ¤/t, nuclear directly follows coal as most
economic option. In the Nh scenario, for rs 2 [0:04;0:08] coal remains the least-cost
option until e 2 [13:0;18:5] ¤/t, for rs 2 [0:02;0:04) until e 2 [15:0;18:5) ¤/t. For
rs 2 [0:04;0:08] gas is the rst option for e in intervals of (13.0,40.5]{18.5 ¤/t, but
vanishes as such for rs < 0:04 irrespective of e. For rs 2 [0:04;0:08] nuclear follows gas
as the most economic option above e 2 [18:5;40:5] ¤/t, for rs 2 [0:02;0:04) directly coal
above e 2 [15:0;18:5) ¤/t. The impact of the additional technology-policy enactment
to environmental policy re
ects its eect in the case of technology policy alone. Coal
tends to be favored, though less than nuclear. Gas persists as least-cost option only in
the Nh scenario, for more moderate levels of technology policy. Also there it is, however,
succeeded by nuclear for rs 2 [0:04;0:0625) already within the relevant e range.
4.2 Technology choice with abatement technology
The end-of-pipe abatement technology with xed abatement unit costs (AUC) may con-
stitute a relevant option only if environmental policy is enacted. It xes the UCT2 for any
e  AUC at the level they have for the given AUC. Under environmental policy alone,
in both scenarios thus coal remains the least-cost option until e  9:75 ¤/t irrespective
of the AUC level. For e 2 (9:75;17:0(53:5)] ¤/t gas is the most economic option in the
Nl (Nh) scenario irrespective of the AUC level, and for AUC 2 [10:0;17:0(53:5)] ¤/t
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Figure 3: Unit costs of electricity for varying CO2-price levels and abatement unit cost
levels between 10 and 60 ¤/t in steps of 10 ¤ under rp = 0:1 and social imputed interest
rates of 0.08, 0.02 in Nl scenario (¤/MWh) (own calculations).
11Figures 3 and 4 display for the Nl and the Nh scenario, respectively, the UCT2 under
environmental and technology policies combined. In the Nl scenario, for rs 2 [0:07;0:08]
coal remains the least-cost option until AUC 2 [10:0;11:0] ¤/t irrespective of e, as until
e 2 [10:0;11:0] ¤/t irrespective of the AUC. For rs 2 [0:02;0:07) it is the least-cost
option until e 2 [5:5;10:0) ¤/t, irrespective of the abatement option. Nuclear domi-
nates for rs 2 [0:07;0:08] above e;AUC 2 [10:0;11:0] ¤/t, for rs 2 [0:02;0:07) above
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Figure 4: Unit costs of electricity for varying CO2-price levels and abatement unit cost
levels between 10 and 60 ¤/t in steps of 10 ¤ under rp = 0:1 and social imputed interest
rates of 0.08, 0.02 in Nh scenario (¤/MWh) (own calculations).
option until AUC 2 [13:0;18:5) ¤/t irrespective of e, as until e 2 [13:0;18:5) ¤/t irre-
spective of the AUC. For rs 2 [0:02;0:04) it is the rst option until AUC 2 [15:0;18:5)
¤/t irrespective of e, as until e 2 [15:0;18:5) ¤/t irrespective of the AUC. For
rs 2 [0:04;0:08] gas is the rst option for AUC in intervals of [13.0,40.5]{18.5 ¤/t
and above e 2 [13:0;18:5] ¤/t, as for e in intervals of [13.0,40.5]{18.5 ¤/t and above
AUC 2 [13:0;18:5] ¤/t. For rs 2 [0:02;0:04) it vanishes as rst option irrespective of the
e and AUC levels. For rs 2 [0:04;0:08] nuclear dominates above e;AUC 2 [18:5;40:5]
¤/t following gas, for rs 2 [0:02;0:04) above e;AUC 2 [15:0;18:5) ¤/t following coal.
The additional technology-policy enactment to environmental policy thus expands the
scope of relevance of the abatement option, though only for very low AUC, also to coal.
It restricts it moreover for gas to only higher rs in the Nh scenario for less high AUC. As
compared to the case without abatement technology the availability of the abatement
option xes, as coal for very low AUC in both scenarios, gas in the Nh scenario as rst
option even until relatively high AUC for all e above relatively low. The scope of nuclear
as least-cost option is, accordingly, restricted by these cases in the two scenarios.
125 Replacement times under environmental and technology policies
In an environment of comparatively rapid technological change, the policy impact on
the timing of structural change constitutes an important aspect. Beginning in 2015 the
utility has at any moment the choice between continuing to use its established technol-
ogy and switching to one of the new less polluting. The period of analysis extends from
t1 = 0 (2015), where UCT2 > UCT1 for all new technologies, until tn, the moment of
transition to the highest-cost alternative, both in the no-policy benchmark.
Denition 1 (Optimal moment of transition)
Given strictly monotonously rising UCT1(t) and monotonous and less steep UCT2(t) than
UCT1(t) in [t1;tn], the optimal moment of transition from production with technology T1
to technology T2, topt, is the moment t 2 [t1;tn] from which UCT1(t)  UCT2(t).
The conditions of Denition 1 are sucient for topt to exist and be unique. The UCT1 are
calculated following the indications in appendix A.2 and section 3.2. For their derivation
an OMCfix(14) = 80:0 T-¤/MWe is considered. For the new plants, for convenience,
the technologies, and thus CC, DC, OMC, are assumed to stay constant over time, while
fuel prices follow their real expected development (Figure 5). In the following, again rst
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Figure 5: Unit costs of electricity of the established and new power plants under rp = 0:1
in no-policy benchmark (¤/MWh) (own calculations).
135.1 Replacement times without abatement technology
In the no-policy benchmark, the new coal-red power plant succeeds its predecessor after
40 years of operation (Table 4). The other technologies would replace the existing plant,
in case of their sole availability, only after the end of its expected economic life. For the
given data the technology ranking of section 4.1 immediately translates into the present
replacement-time ranking.7
Optimal transition moment
C G Nl Nh
14.0 17.8 17.9 22.5
Table 4: Optimal moments of transition in cases of sole availability of any single new
plant alternative, in years of operation of established plant from year in which analysis
begins, i.e. 2015 (own calculations).
5.1.1 Sensitivity under environmental policy
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Figure 6: Optimal moments of transition to new plant alternatives for varying CO2 prices
(¤/t) under rp = 0:1 (own calculations).
In the Nl scenario, the new coal-red power plant remains the rst option to replace
the old until e = 11:5 ¤/t, with trepl 2 [12:6;14:0]. For e > 11:5 ¤/t nuclear replaces
7 This is a particular case. For a dierent UCT1 or UCT2 behavior the ranking in general diers.
14it with trepl 2 [0:0;12:5], for e  23:5 ¤/t immediately (i.e. in t = 0). Gas plays
no role as rst option. In the Nh scenario, the new coal-red plant remains the rst
option until e = 17:75 ¤/t, with trepl 2 [11:8;14:0]. For e 2 (17:75;53:5] ¤/t gas
replaces the established plant, with trepl 2 [0;11:8), immediately for e  28:75 ¤/t. For
e > 53:5 ¤/t nuclear is the rst alternative, replacing the old plant immediately. The
dierences among the technologies mainly depend on the varied dierences in emission
factors and net thermal eciencies between the established and the new technologies.
Moreover, the trepl shapes dier over the e range, due to the particular UCT1 shape over
time, depending on whether the optimal moments of transition lie beyond or within the
expected economic lifetime of the established plant.
5.1.2 Sensitivity under technology policy
With respect to the rs implementation in this section two further assumption are met.
It is, rst, assumed to be newly introduced in t = 0 and, second, to apply only to
the new technologies. The rst assumption implies that it is not relevant for T1 before
t = 0, the second that it has also no direct relevance for it in t = 0 or later. (Its actual
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Figure 7: Optimal moments of transition to new plant alternatives for varying levels of
social imputed interest rate (own calculations).
of the optimal moments of transition for rs 2 [0:02;0:08]. In both scenarios coal remains
the rst technology to replace the established over the whole rs range considered, with
trepl 2 [2:7;11:0]. In the Nl scenario, the replacement-time ranking between gas and
nuclear is reversed for rs  0:08, in the Nh scenario for rs < 0:034. The varied eect of
technology policy on the replacement times of the dierent technologies is a combined
15outcome of, rst, its varied UCT1 eect and, second, the particular shapes of the dierent
UCel curves, especially the UCT1 curve. The negative UCT2 impact of technology policy
materialises here in the higher replacement-time reductions the 
atter the UCT1 curve
at the place in question. For the rs levels considered, the eect is accordingly, in general,
the strongest for coal, before nuclear in the Nl scenario, nuclear in the Nh scenario,
and gas. An exception to this rule is nuclear in the Nl scenario. For rs 2 [0:02;0:057],
where its optimal moments of transition lie beyond the expected economic life of the
established power plant, it is, in absolute terms, less strongly aected than in the Nh
scenario. Moreover, for rs < 0:057, where its optimal moments of transition lie within
the expected economic life of the established power plant, it is, at the margin, in absolute
terms, at least as strongly aected as coal, and usually more.
5.1.3 Sensitivity under environmental and technology policies
The combined in
uence of environmental and technology policies on the behavior of
the optimal moments of transition in the Nl and the Nh scenario, respectively, over
the e range considered for rp = 0:1 and exemplary rs of 0.08 and 0.02 can be seen
from the strong UCT2 lines and their parallels in Figures 8 and 9 below. In the Nl
scenario, for rs 2 [0:02;0:08] coal remains the rst option until e 2 [6:0;9:75] ¤/t,
with trepl 2 [1:9;11:0]. Above e 2 [6:0;9:75] ¤/t, nuclear is the rst option, with
trepl 2 [0:0;9:6]. In the Nh scenario, for rs 2 [0:05;0:08] coal is the rst option until
e 2 [18:5;20:0) ¤/t, with trepl 2 [3:8;11:0], for rs 2 [0:02;0:05) until e 2 [15:0;20:0)
¤/t, with trepl 2 [0:4;3:7). For rs 2 [0:05;0:08], gas is the rst option for e in in-
tervals of [18.5,40.5]{20.0 ¤/t, with trepl 2 [3:6;8:7]. For rs < 0:05, it vanishes as
rst option for any e. For rs 2 [0:05;0:08] nuclear follows gas as rst option above
e 2 (20:0;40:5] ¤/t, for rs 2 [0:02;0:05) directly coal for e 2 (15:0;20:0] ¤/t and
higher, with trepl 2 [0:0;3:6]. The additional technology-policy impact to environmen-
tal policy re
ects the combined eect at work in the case of its sole enactment, on the
dierent UCT2 and due to the particular shapes of the dierent UCel curves. Accordingly,
the least-cost range of coal is in the Nl scenario restricted in favor of nuclear, while ex-
panding in the Nh scenario at the expense of gas. The least-cost range of gas, persisting
as rst option only for higher rs levels in the Nh scenario, is restricted from above by
nuclear, which succeeds it for rs 2 [0:05;0:0625) already within the relevant e range.
5.2 Replacement times with abatement technology
The end-of-pipe abatement option now xes both UCT1 and UCT2 for any e  AUC
at their level for the given AUC. Graphically, it curbs the with increasing e falling
replacement-time curves at their level for the given AUC. Under environmental policy
alone, in the Nl scenario, coal remains the rst option for AUC  11:5 ¤/t irrespective
of e, as for e  11:5 ¤/t irrespective of the AUC, with trepl 2 [12:6;14:0] in each
case. For e;AUC > 11:5 ¤/t nuclear is the rst alternative. In the Nh scenario, coal
dominates for AUC  17:5 ¤/t irrespective of e, as for any e  17:5 ¤/t irrespective
of the AUC, with trepl 2 [11:9;14:0] in each case. For AUC 2 (17:5;53:5] ¤/t gas is the
16rst alternative for any e > 17:5 ¤/t, as for e 2 (17:5;53:5] ¤/t if AUC > 17:5 ¤/t,
with trepl 2 [0:0;11:9] in each case. Nuclear is the rst option for e;AUC > 53:5 ¤/t.
Figures 8 and 9 show for the Nl and the Nh scenario, respectively, the behavior of the
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Figure 8: Optimal moments of transition to new plant alternatives for varying CO2 prices
and abatement unit cost levels between 10 and 30 ¤/t in steps of 10 ¤ under rp = 0:1
and social imputed interest rates of 0.08, 0.02 in Nl scenario (own calculations).
In the Nl scenario, for rs 2 [0:02;0:08] coal remains the rst option until e 2 [6:0;9:75]
¤/t, with trepl 2 [1:9;11:0]. Above e 2 [6:0;9:75] ¤/t, nuclear is the rst option, with
trepl 2 [0:0;9:6]. Neither end-of-pipe abatement option nor CCGT technology in
uence
the determination of the rst option. In the Nh scenario, for rs 2 [0:05;0:08] coal is the
rst option until AUC 2 [18:5;20:0) ¤/t irrespective of e, as until e 2 [18:5;20:0) ¤/t
irrespective of the AUC, with trepl 2 [3:8;11:0]. For rs 2 [0:02;0:05) it remains the rst
option until AUC 2 (15:0;20:0] ¤/t irrespective of e, as until e 2 (15:0;20:0] ¤/t
irrespective of the AUC, with trepl 2 [0:4;3:7]. For rs 2 [0:05;0:08] gas is the rst
option for AUC in intervals of [18.5,40.5]{20.0 ¤/t and e in intervals of [18.5,40.5]{
20.0 ¤/t and higher, as for e in intervals of [18.5,40.5]{20.0 ¤/t and AUC in intervals
of [18.5,40.5]{20.0 ¤/t and higher, with trepl 2 [3:6;8:7]. For rs < 0:05 it vanishes as
rst option irrespective of e and AUC. For rs 2 [0:05;0:08] nuclear dominates above
e;AUC 2 (20:0;40:5] ¤/t, for rs 2 [0:02;0:05) above e;AUC 2 (15:0;20:0] ¤/t, with
trepl 2 [0:0;3:6]. The additional technology-policy enactment to environmental policy
restricts thus the scope of relevance of the abatement option to the Nh scenario, and
there, while slightly expanding it for coal, further restricts it for gas to only higher rs for
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Figure 9: Optimal moments of transition to new plant alternatives for varying CO2 prices
and abatement unit cost levels between 10 and 40 ¤/t in steps of 10 ¤ under rp = 0:1
and social imputed interest rates of 0.08, 0.02 in Nh scenario (own calculations).
xes in the Nh scenario coal until low AUC and gas even until relatively high AUC
for all e above relatively low as rst option. The scope of nuclear as rst option is,
accordingly, restricted only in the Nh scenario.
6 Summary and discussion of results
This section summarises and discusses the results of sections 4 and 5 in four points.
(1) Environmental policy alone raises the UCT2, the more the more polluting a tech-
nology, and reduces the replacement times, the more the cleaner the new technology
as compared to the established. The technology and replacement-time rankings, of coal
before gas and nuclear in the no-policy benchmark, reverse for e > 17:0 (53.5) and
e > 17:5 (53.5) ¤/t, respectively, in the Nl (Nh) scenario. While in the earlier studies
BEI (2004) and IEA and NEA (2005) gas becomes protable over hard coal from higher
e at lower rp (30{35 ¤/t for r = 0:08, 30 ¤/t for r = 0:05, respectively), EWI and
Prognos (2005) forecasts for a linearly rising e until 15 ¤(2000)/t in 2030 a neat cut
back of hard coal in favor of gas. For e  15 ¤/t the latter projection occurs as roughly
consistent with the present results for environmental policy alone, even including nuclear
in the Nl scenario.
(2) Technology policy lowers the UCT2, the more the higher the technology-specic
capital-investment costs. It also reduces the replacement times as compared to the no-
policy benchmark. Due to the particular shapes of the UCel curves, the latter impact is
18in general the strongest for coal before nuclear and gas. While coal keeps its no-policy
status as rst option in both the technology and the replacement-time ranking, in the
former nuclear and gas reverse their order below higher rs levels in the Nl scenario. In
the latter, nuclear replaces gas as second option over the whole rs range (below lower
rs levels) in the Nl (Nh) scenario. The distortion induced by the split imputed interest
rates amounts for rs 2 [0:02;0:08] to about 1.0{12.5 (18.5) ¤/MWh or 2.5{27.0 (31.5)%
of the distorted UCT2 at the busbar in the Nl (Nh) scenario. It stays thus, e.g., neatly be-
low the payments under the German \Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz" (EEG, Renewable
Energy Sources Act), which prescribes feed-in taris for renewable energy technologies.8
According to it, suppliers receive 457{624, 55{91, and 71.6{150 ¤/MWh for power from
photovoltaics, wind energy, and geothermal energy, respectively.
(3) The additional enactment of technology policy to environmental policy gener-
ally favors coal, but less than nuclear. Gas is never the rst option in the Nl scenario
anymore. The technology and replacement-time rankings reverse, as compared to the no-
policy benchmark, over the rs range considered for e 2 [13:0;21:0] ([15.0,40.5]) ¤/t and
e 2 [18:75;21:0] ([20.0,40.5]) ¤/t, respectively, and higher. Nuclear now competes in
both rankings, for probable e and rs levels, also in the Nh scenario. This results derives
departing from slightly higher CC than in IEA and NEA (2005) in the Nl, and slightly
lower CC than in Enquetekommission (2002) in the Nh scenario and contrasts notably to
the latter study. It underlines the importance of the CC level which ultimately realises.
(4) The end-of-pipe abatement option xes, for e  AUC, UCT1 and UCT2, and with
them also the replacement times, at their level for those AUC. For e > AUC, it thus
extends the economic life of the established plant and delays the structural change. Under
environmental policy, it does not aect the results for coal in the technology ranking. In
the replacement-time ranking it aects them only for very low AUC. Gas is xed as rst
option for suciently low AUC levels, of 10.0{17.0 (53.5) ¤/t in the Nl (Nh) scenario
in the former ranking and AUC 2 (17:5;53:5] ¤/t in the Nh scenario in the latter, for
any e within these ranges and higher. The additional enactment of technology policy
restricts its scope of relevance in any case. Nuclear is excluded as rst option for any e,
where the abatement option is relevant for coal or gas. The derived AUC ranges to x a
technology as rst option for respective e coincide only for gas in the Nh scenario with
parts of its expected AUC range (section 3.2), also for technology policy. Otherwise,
they stay below the relevant ranges, for coal neatly. These results conrm other studies,
such as EWI and Prognos (2005), WI et al. (2007), projecting as yet only a minor role
for CCS technologies in the period under consideration.
7 Conclusion
This paper studies the welfare implications of diverging social and private discount rates
for investments in the German power industry around 2015 against the standard back-
8 The EEG was rst enacted in April 2000, succeeding the 1991 \Stromeinspeisegesetz", the rst act
to promote the introduction of renewable energies in Germany by subsidies. Its stated purpose is to
increase the share of electricity from renewable energies to at least 12.5% in 2010 and 20% in 2020.
19ground of environmental policy. Several results of interest derive. Whether environmental
policy alone induces the reversal of the no-policy technology ranking (coal before gas
and nuclear) in the middle of, or well beyond the expected CO2-price range depends on
whether the low or the high nuclear cost scenario is considered. In the hypothetic sole
implementation of the social imputed interest rate coal remains the rst option over the
whole rs parameter range considered. The order of gas and nuclear may reverse. The dis-
tortions implied by the diverging imputed interest rates remain moderate as compared,
e.g., to the payments under the German 2000 Renewable Energy Sources Act. The addi-
tional implementation of the social imputed interest rate to environmental policy makes
nuclear the rst option also in the high-cost scenario for probable e and rs levels. A
new end-of-pipe abatement option delays for suciently high e the introduction of new
cleaner technologies. However, according to the derived AUC ranges to x a technology
as rst option only a minor role for CCS technologies is to be expected in the period
under consideration.
The paper points to dierent issues for further research. Especially, there is thus far no
systematic literature treating the causes of the split of social and private interest rates
and respective policy implications. To more accurately quantify the discount-rate dis-
tortion technology-specic nancing conditions should moreover be taken into account.
As regards particular technologies, despite advancing research the nuclear option is to
be further investigated for Germany. For a more complete comparison among relevant
technological options the extension of the present analysis to renewable energy sources
is desirable. Interesting dierentiations to the present results could derive from the ex-
tension of the analysis in section 5 to real option values as associated with the waiting
to invest in new technologies. The development of a nancing model better accounting




The capital costs of a power plant comprise its capital-investment and decommissioning costs.9
The two cost types occur before commissioning and after the end of a plant's operating life,
respectively. They constitute one-time costs.
The capital-investment costs, CC, consist of the power plant's construction-investment costs
and the imputed interest payment. The construction-investment costs, Ic, derive as the product
of technology specic investment costs, Isp, and net installed capacity ICnet,
Ic = IspICnet : (A.1)
The CC are included in the annual cost analysis via the cost-accounting depreciation. As-
suming straight-line depreciation, the annual amount of depreciation, D(t), derives as the T th
d
9 In accord with the empirical data available, major refurbishment, as a type of capital cost occuring
during operation, is included in the O&M costs (appendix A.1.2).





Economically, Td coincides with a plant's (expected) economic life. In this paper, in accord
with the applied literature, to account for the increased uncertainty after liberalisation, Td is
assumed not to exceed the planning horizon, T, of an investment project. For all technologies
Td = 20 is supposed.10
The annual imputed interest payment, IIP(t), refers to the salvage value of Ic in t. Pay-
ments and depreciation are assumed to be made at the end of a period. In the rst year of
operation, the interest is thus paid on the full construction-investment costs. The imputed




Td )r ; if t  Td
0 ; if t > Td
; (A.3)
where r is the real imputed interest rate, which is assumed to be constant.
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; if t  Td
0 ; if t > Td
: (A.4)
A plant's decommissioning costs, DC, derive as the product of the specic decommissioning
costs of the technology, DCsp, and net installed capacity, ICnet,
DC = DCspICnet : (A.5)
A.1.2 Costs during operation
As costs categories incurred during a plant's economic lifetime, in this paper (i) operation and
maintenance (O&M), (ii) fuel, (iii) emission, and (iv) abatement costs are distinguished.
O&M costs, OMC, include all costs for plant operation and maintenance, apart from fuel,
emission, and abatement costs. Fixed specic annual O&M costs, OMCfix(t), comprise labor,
maintenance and insurance costs per unit of ICnet in t. Variable specic O&M costs, OMCvar,
consist of the costs for operating supplies other than fuel and emission costs, per amount of
output produced in t, x(t). The latter derives as ICnet times hours of full-load operation, hfl(t),
x(t) = ICnethfl(t) : (A.6)
The O&M costs in period t can thus be determined as
OMC(t) = OMCfix(t)ICnet + OMCvarx(t) : (A.7)
10 This facilitates the calculations, but constitutes a simplication. The reduced depreciation term pro-
vides, to some extent, for less favorable UCel, the more the higher the CC. The appropriate Td
treatment constitutes a particular issue to be claried with respect to the systematic consideration
of the utilities' varied risk exposure.
21Fuel costs, FC, include the costs related to fuel supply at the plant, including commodity
price and transport.11 This paper refers to the estimated (mean) fuel price, pfuel, during the
remaining economic life of a power plant. The annual fuel costs are further determined by the





The annual fuel costs are calculated as
FC(t) = FCs(t)pfuel : (A.9)
Emission costs, EC, are calculated as the product of annual amount of emissions generated,
E(t), deriving as annual fuel consumption times technology specic emission factor, fem,
E(t) = FCs(t)fem ; (A.10)
and the emission price, e(t), which is assumed to be in real terms,
EC(t) = e(t)E(t) : (A.11)
Abatement costs, AC, are calculated as the product of the annual amount of emissions
generated, E(t), and specic abatement costs, ACsp(t), per mass unit of emission,12
AC(t) = ACsp(t)E(t) : (A.12)
A.1.3 Unit costs of electricity generation
To determine the UCel, rst, the real levelised costs of electricity generation, RLC, over T are
calculated. Then, they are divided by the mean annual amount of electricity generated, x.
The real levelised costs, RLC, indicate the mean annual costs of electricity generation by
a power plant in a particular year of operation during T. In this paper, following the co-
termination approach (Bejan et al. 1996: 386f), for all investment projects a common T is
chosen, equal to the expected economic life of the shortest lived alternative. In this case for
any longer lived alternative the salvage value at the end of T is added to the particular project's
net present value discounted with the discount rate of the last year of T. To calculate the RLC,




CC(t) + OMC(t) + FC(t) + EC(t) + AC(t)
(1 + r)t : (A.13)
The corresponding RLC part derives by multiplication with the capital-recovery factor,
r(1+r)T
(1+r)T 1
(Bejan et al. 1996: 355{357). The DC are to be levelised using the uniform-series sinking fund
factor, r
(1+r)Td 1. The RLC thus amount to
RLC = PVbd(T)
r(1 + r)T
(1 + r)T   1
+ DC
r
(1 + r)Td   1
: (A.14)





11 In the case of nuclear power they include all costs related to the up-stream and down-stream steps
of the fuel cycle as well as the costs of transportation between the steps.
12 Despite the capital-cost component of the end-of-pipe abatement facility, in accord with the empirical
data, in this study abatement costs are only considered as proportional to current emissions.
22A.2 Unit costs of electricity of the established technology
In general, the UCT1 are determined as indicated above. As T1 enters the analysis at some
time t1 during its time of operation and for the analysis its unit costs in that period and the
following years of operation are needed, their determination is subject to some particularities.
t1 is the rst year in which the new power plants could be commissioned. tn the moment of
transition to the highest-cost alternative in the no-policy benchmark. By denition, for the
end of the plant's expected economic lifetime tend 2 [t1;tn] holds. By lack of reliable empirical
data in the literature, in this paper the UCT1 shape in the no-policy benchmark is callibrated
with respect to the following stylised indications, ceteris paribus:
(1) In t1, the established plant is fully depreciated and nancial reserves are built up for
decommissioning, such that all capital costs are sunk. Over the whole of the plant's time
of operation, ICnet, x, and, with net, also FCs(t) are xed. The UCT1(t) behavior,
t 2 [t1;tn], is thus only determined by the development of pfuel, OMCfix, and OMCvar.
While the pfuel schedule is empirically given, for the OMCk, k 2 ffix;varg, only mean
values over the plant's expected economic lifetime are available in the literature.
(2) In t1, the OMCk, k 2 ffix;varg, meet their arithmetical mean over the plant's expected
economic lifetime, OMCk.
(3) In tend, the UCT1 are equal to the UCT2 of the least-cost alternative among the new
technologies, such that for t = tend the following equation holds:
UCT1(t) =
OMCfix(t)ICnet + OMCvar(t)x + pfuel(t)FCs
x
= UCT2(t) : (A.16)











OMCk(t) = OMCk ; (A.18)
where tcom is the plant's year of commissioning, TL its expected economic lifetime.
(5) In any specic year t 2 ft1;t2;:::;tendg, the UCT1(t) are determined like UCel in equation
(A.14), with T = tend   t+1. In each further period t 2 ftend+1;tend+2;:::;tng, the new
planning horizon T = 1, which comes to the same as to substitute in equation (A.14)
for RLC the current costs, i.e. here OMC(t) + FC(t).
Under environmental policy, the UCT1 are further determined by EC as well as eventual AC.
23A.3 Summary of technical, nancing, and cost parameters
Parameters Unit C (old) C (new) G Nl / Nh
Technical parameters
Year of commissioning - 1990 2015 2015 2015
Economic life yrs 40 40 25 40
Net installed capacity MWe 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500
Net thermal eciency - 0.45 0.51 0.60 0.37
CO2 emission factor t/MWh 0.338 0.338 0.200 0.0
Capacity factor - 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85
Electricity generated in t TWh 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5
Annual fuel consumption TWh 23.3 20.6 17.5 28.3
Financing parameters
Cost accounting term of
depreciation yrs 20 20 20 20
Planning horizon yrs 25 25 25 25
Private imputed interest
rate - 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Cost parameters
Specic investment costs T-¤/MWe 925 1,025 500 1,800/2,600
Specic decommissioning
costs T-¤/MWe 34.5 34.5 15.8 155.0
Specic annual O&M
costs (x) T-¤/MWe 40.0 36.6 18.8 30.0
Specic O&M costs (var.) ¤/MWh 4.0 2.7 1.6 3.6
Mean fuel price ¤/MWh 6.55 7.13 17.16 4.00
Abatement unit costs ¤/t 37{70 37{70 32{65 0
Table 5: Assumptions for technical, nancing, and cost parameters in year of commis-
sioning of established and rst year of availability for operation of new reference power
plants as explained in the text, prices of 2005 (various sources).
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